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1. INTRODUCTION
Local governments in South Carolina have only recently become an
important part of the state's political structure.2 South Carolina has long been a
centralized state, with the General Assembly wielding enormous power on both
the state and local level.3 Today, municipal and county governments have the
I. This Note focuses on county government, while sporadically mentioning municipal
government. In South Carolina, county government has been less developed than municipal
government. See 2 JAMES LOWELL UNDERWOOD. THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
VOLUME 11: THE JOURNEY TOWARD LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 1 (1989) (noting that state
government has closely controlled its counties, in particular).
2. See Duncan v. Cnty. of York, 267 S.C. 327, 333-35, 228 S.E.2d 92, 95 (1976)
(discussing the development of county government); COLE BLEASE GRAHAiM JR. & WILLIAM V.
MOORE, SOUTH CAROLINA POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 199 205 (1994) (citations omitted)
(discussing the development of municipal and county government).
3. GRAHAM & MOORE, supra note 2. at 198: LEWIS P. JONES. SOUTH CAROLINA: A
SYNOPTIC 1ISTORY FOR LAYMEN 263 (rev. ed. 1999). For a discussion of local-government history
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autonomy to provide numerous services to their constituents.) However, the
General Assembly has not completely relinquished its grip over local
governments. Remnants of South Carolina's "legislative state"6 remain,
creating a lack of accountability and transparency in government.
For most of South Carolina's history, the General Assembly controlled local
government, especially the counties.8 A county's legislative delegation passed
an annual "supply bill" and other local laws in the General Assembly to operate
the county.9 Thus, representatives served a dual role as state legislators on
statewide issues and as local legislators for their counties.10  By the 1970s,
legislative rule over local government was increasingly inefficient and
ineffective. Therefore, there was growing demand for what is commonly
known as "home rule," a term of art used to describe local government
autonomy.13  South Carolina responded by amending the state constitution in
1973 (Home Rule Amendments)14 and passing the Home Rule Act in 1975,
in South Carolina under the various constitutions, see generally Jenny Anderson Horne, Comment.
Counties and Municipalities Given Broad Power to Raise Revenue, 48 S.C. L. REv. 175. 176-79
(1996).
4. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-9-30 (1986 & Supp. 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. 5-7-30 (2004 &
Supp. 2012).
5. For an example of continued legislative involvement in local affairs, see Cindi Ross
Scoppe, Op-Ed., Legislative Appointees: The Protected Class, THE STATE, Nov. 18, 2012, at
D2, available at http://www.thestate.com/2012/111/18/2522784/scoppe-legislative-appointees.htmil
(highlighting the problems created by legislative delegations appointing members to local boards).
6. The phrases "legislative state" and "legislative government" can both refer to the General
Assembly's dominance of South Carolina politics. In his classic work, Southern Politics in State
and Nation, V.0. Key described South Carolina politics as "legislative government." V.0. KEY,
JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 150 (1949); see also Cindi Ross Scoppe, Op-Ed.,
A Common Thread Connects an Election Bungled Beyond Imagination and a Computer Breach of
Monumental Impact: The Legislative State, THE STATE, Dec. 2, 2012, at D2, available at http://www.
thestate.com/2012/12/02/2539291/scoppe-the-common-root-of-computer.html (attempting to trace the
history of the term "legislative state").
7. See, e.g., Cindi Ross Scoppe, Op-Ed., This Debacle Brought to You by Single-County
Lais, THE STATE, Nov. 14, 2012, at A6, available at http://ww.tlhestate.com/2012/"11/14/
2518556/scoppe-richland-county -election.html (noting how single-county laws circumvent the
legislative process).
8. GRAHAM & MOORE, supra note 2, at 199, UNDERWOOD, supra note I, at 1. See
generally Home, supra note 3, at 176-79 (discussing the history of local government in South
Carolina).
9. KEY, supra note 6. at 151; see also Home, supra note 3, at 177 (noting how even minor
deviations from the supply bill required lobbying the General Assembly).
10. See Duncan v. Cnty. of York, 267 S.C. 327, 334, 228 S.E.2d 92. 95 (1976).
11. See UNDERWOOD, supra note 1, at 116.
12. The phrase "home rule" emerged in the 1800s as a reference to laws passed to empower
local governments. DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK, at
ix (2001). The term is used generally to signify "municipal independence." Id. (quoting ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 46 (Henry Reeve trans., The Legal Classics Library
1988) (1835)). For a discussion of the differences between "constitutional home rule" and
"legislative home rule," see generally Home, supra note 3, at 179 82.
13. Duncan, 267 S.C. at 335, 228 S.E.2d at 95.
14. See 1973 S.C. Acts 67.
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which created stron er local governments with significant independence from
the state legislature. The goals of these changes were to remove legislative
control of local government and to allow municipal and county governments to
assume more responsibility. 16
To ensure independence for the local governments, new article VIII, section
7 prohibited the General Assembly from passing laws specific to one county,
thereby ending the practice of controlling local government from the State
House. However, the South Carolina Supreme Court's strict interpretation of
section 7 prevents legislation giving local governments the independence and
influence sought by home rule.i As a result, the vehicle driving home rule in
South Carolina is stuck in neutral. Therefore, to effectuate the spirit of home
rule and the desires of South Carolinians, the South Carolina Supreme Court
should return to its original interpretation of article VIII, section 719 and allow
the General Assembly to pass local laws that promote home rule by empowering
local government.
Part II of this Note discusses the historical development of county
government in South Carolina and the reasons underlying the addition of revised
article VIII to the South Carolina Constitution. Part III provides an analysis of
the South Carolina Supreme Court's interpretations of article VIII. section 7 and
demonstrates the problems with the court's reasoning. Part IV charts a course
for the court to provide a more effective government by the people and for the
people of South Carolina. Part V concludes this Note.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH CAROLINA
A. Local Government Before Home Rule Under the Constitutions of 1868
and 1895
A brief chronicle of local-government development in South Carolina is
valuable to understanding the home rule movement. Prior to the Civil War, local
governments in this state were mostly insignificant.20 The General Assembly
15. See 1975 S.C. Acts 692 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 4-9-10 to -1230 (1986 & Supp.
2012)).
16. See Knight v. Salisbury, 262 S.C. 565, 569, 206 S.E.2d 875, 876 (1974) ("Article VIII
reflects a serious effort upon the part of the electorate and the General Assembly to restore local
governent to the county level.").
17. See S.C. CONST. art. VIII, 7.
18. See Davis v. Richland Cnty. Council, 372 S.C. 497, 501-04, 642 S.E.2d 740, 742-43
(2007) (citations omitted): H-amm v. Cromer, 305 S.C. 305, 307-09, 408 S.E.2d 227, 228-29 (1991)
(citations omitted): H-orry Cnty. v. Cooke. 275 S.C. 19, 23-25, 267 S.E.2d 82, 84-85 (1980)
(citations omitted); Duncan, 267 S.C. at 348, 228 S.E.2d at 101.
19. See Duncan. 267 S.C. at 345, 228 S.E.2d at 100.
20. See COLNMBUs ANDREWS, ADMINISTRATIVE COUNTY GOVERNM1ENT N SOUTH
CAROLINA 5 (1933).
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dominated government at all levels.' It controlled various committees and
agencies that carried out administrative functions at the local level.22 At that
time, the term "county" was primarily used to reference land ownership,23 and
road commissioners, Anglican parishes, and various courts governed the rural
24areas of the state. The General Assembly incorporated some of the more
populated areas as cities.25 The governing boards of these cities were given
some independent authority, but legislative influence was still present.26
The South Carolina Constitution of 1868 dealt with local government in a
surprisingly contemporary fashion.27 That document designated the state's
political subdivisions as counties28 and established a Board of County
Commissioners for each. Each board had some independent responsibility and
was directly elected by the citizens. Although this local-government structure
was a step forward for counties, many legislative restrictions reigned in the
boards' authority and empowered the General Assembly to act in local matters.3
In addition, the constitution of 1868 had powerful, vocal opponents who
criticized the government structure for being too elaborate and for fostering
corruption. 2  Ultimately, the General Assembly repealed these provisions in
1890.
From 1895 until 1973, local governments operated tinder the framework
provided in the South Carolina Constitution of 1895. 34 The local-government
provisions of the constitution were a reaction to the supposed abuses of power
and inefficiencies that the 1868 constitution created.35 The constitution allowed
for the formation of new, smaller counties and severely limited their fiscal
autonomy. 3 Significantly, the constitution was silent on county governing
21. See KEY, supra note 6, at 150-52.
22. See UNDERWOOD, supra note I, at 12.
23. GRAiAM & MOORE, supra note 2, at 200.
24. See UNDERWOOD, supra note I, at 12.
25. See GRAHAM & MOORE, supra note 2, at 204-05.
26. See UNDERWOOD, supra note 1. at 34-35.
27. The South Carolina Constitution of 1868 was a byproduct of Congressional
Reconstruction. Therefore, the document was unconventional in many respects. See UNDERWOOD,
supra note 1, at 46-48 (citations omitted).
28. See S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 3.
29. See S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 19.
30. See id.
31. See UNDERWOOD, supra note 1. at 62-65 (citations omitted).
32. See id. at 50-54 (citations omitted) (outlining generally the allegations of local
governments abusing their power).
33. See 1890 S.C. Acts 649.
34. See S.C. CONST. art. VIII.
35. See UNDERWOOD, supra note 1. at 67 (citations omitted). See generally S.C. CONST. art.
VIII (providing the local government provisions of the constitution).
36. See S.C. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
37. See UNDERWOOD, supra note 1. at 75-83 (citations omitted) (discussing the limitations
on local government fiscal powers).
784 [VOL. 64: 781
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boards. 8 Not surprisingly, the legislative delegations assumed the responsibility
to govern the county.
General Assembly control of county government led to excessive variation
from county to county across the state.40 The legislative delegation governed the
county by enacting an annual "supply bill" as local legislation in the General
Assembly.41 Although such legislation required enactment by the entire
legislature, the other members deferred to each county's delegation.42 Though
subject to criticism, local government by legislative delegation proved to be a
43fairly effective mode of governance for many years. However, as the next
Section explores, societal changes highlighted problems and brought about the
need for reform.44
B. Changes in South Carolina and Growing Demand for a New System
Two major developments in the middle of the twentieth century challenged
the effectiveness of the so-called "legislative state" and triggered statewide local-
government reform.4 First, after World War 11, economic and demographic
changes transformed South Carolina., and the constitution of 1895 was not suited
for the new changes.4 6 Second. reapportionment created a practical obstacle for
the custom of operating local government through the legislative delegation.4 7
Local-government rule by legislative delegation had been possible in part
because each county in South Carolina represented one election district.48
Therefore, a delegation represented one entire county and could legislate
according to the needs of that county. 49 However, in 1964, in the landmark case
Reynolds v. Sis,5 0 the United States Supreme Court held that all state legislators
were required to represent more or less an equal number of people.'1 As a result,
election districts crossed county lines to achieve proportional representation.
The new election districts compromised the General Assembly's practice of
38. See id. at 93 (citing S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. TV, § 19) (comparing the 1868 and 1895
constitutions).
39. See id.
40. See id. (citing ANDREWS, supra note 20, at 37).
41. KEY, supra note 6, at 151.
42. See Duncan v. Cnty. of York, 267 S.C. 327, 334, 228 S.E.2d 92. 95 (1976).
43. See UNDERWOOD, supra note 1. at 103.
44. See id. at 105.
45. See GRAHAM & MOORE, supra note 2. at 203-04 (citations omitted); UNDERWOOD,
supra note 1, at 105.
46. See UNDERWOOD, supra note 1. at 105; GRAHAM & MOORE, supra note 2. at 203-04
(citations omitted).
47. See Duncan, 267 S.C. at 334-35, 228 S.E.2d at 95.
48. See id. at 334, 228 S.E.2d at 95.
49. See id.
50. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
51. Id. at 568.
52. See Duncan, 267 S.C. at 334-35, 228 S.E.2d at 95.
2013] 785
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passing local bills at the State House to run the counties. Local bills now
involved more than one delegation with occasionally competing interests.
Even before reapportionment challenged legislative rule, the constitution of
1895 began to show its age.5 5  The constitution's archaic model of operating
count government at the State House represented an outdated view of the
state. Rural population growth and the shift from an agrarian-based economy
to a more industrial economy demanded many new government services.5 As a
result, certain counties began to experiment with creating stronger county
governments. One such experiment in Charleston County proved successful
and provided an impetus for statewide reform. 59
A detailed report-the "Ricketts Report-prepared for the Charleston
County legislative delegation summarized the problems that South Carolina's
local-government structure posed for Charleston.6 0 The Ricketts Report detailed
the fragmentation of authority among the abundant local agencies and
commissions. The legislative delegations often lacked control of the numerous
local entities. The Ricketts Report noted that "[t]here is no local legislative
body . . . [to] take prompt legislative action with respect to local situations."6 3
In response to the Ricketts Report, Charleston County citizens voted to
establish a county council with extensive home rule powers. 64 The experiment
was a success, and other counties soon followed suit. 6 5 Still, the constitution of
1895 presented significant impediments to these new county governments. 66it
became apparent that constitutional reforms were needed to establish
governments for each county and to grant home rule authority to those
governments.67 In 1969, the General Assembly created the Committee to Make
a Study of the South Carolina Constitution of 1895 (West Committee), charged
with examining all phases of the constitution and recommending revisions.68
53. See id.
54. See id
55. See UNDERWOOD, supra note 1, at 116.
56. See id.
57. See generally JONES. supra note 3. at 266-74 (discussing economic and demographic
changes across the state 1940-1978).
58. See Knight v. Salisbury, 262 S.C. 565. 571, 206 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1974).
59. See id.
60. See PUB. ADMIN. SERV.. SURVEY OF CHARLESTON COUNTY GOVERNMENT 1-4 (1945)
(available at the South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia, S.C.).
61. See id at 2-3.
62. See id.
63. See id at 3.
64. See Knight, 262 S.C. at 571, 206 S.E.2d at 877 (citing 1948 S.C. Acts 1873).
65. See id ('[A]t this writing there are perhaps 18 counties whose governments are patterned
after the fashion of the Charleston County Council Act.").
66. See UNDERWOOD, supra note 1, at 115.
67. See id at 116.
68. See S. Con. Res. 342, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. 1014 (S.C. 1966); H.R. Con.
Res. 1044, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. 783 (S.C. 1967); see also COMM. TO MAKE A STUDY
786 [VOL. 64: 781
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C. The Home Rule Amendments and Implementing Legislation
The West Committee's deliberations concerning local government revolved
around one fundamental question: how much control should the state have over
its political subdivisions? 69  Ultimately. the West Committee recommended
stronger self-government powers for counties and less state control over the
counties throughout the state. 70
Upon the recommendation of the West Committee, revised article VIII was
added to the constitution. Section 7 is the crucial provision and it has two
important parts72  First, it requires the General Assembly (1) to provide by
general law for the structure and responsibilities of counties and (2) to create no
more than five alternative forms of government from among which the voters
can choose. Second, section 7 prohibits the General Assembly from enacting
laws for a specific county.74 The prohibition on local laws forced the General
Assembly to grant self-government authority to the counties. Article VIII was
not self-executing, but it rather operated as a mandate to the General Assembly.76
Therefore, the General Assembly had to enact implementing legislation to
determine the structure and authority of the new governments.77
The Home Rule Act (the Act) that went into effect on June 25, 1975, dealt
with the issues left to the General Assembly tinder the constitutional
amendments.78 The first portion of the Act allows the electorate in a county to
choose by referendum a form of government that best meets the needs of that
county. 79 The second portion of the Act outlines the basic powers that the new
county governments possess and can exercise. The General Assembly granted
the counties substantial powers, including, but not limited to, those powers
previously contained in the "county purpose doctrine,"81 greater fiscal and
OF THE S.C. CONSTITUTION OF 1895, FINAL REPORT (1969) [hereinafter WEST Comm. FINAL
REPORT] (recommending substantial revisions to the constitution).
69. See UNDERWOOD, supra note 1. at 117.
70. See WEST COmm. FINAL REPORT, supra note 68, at 84 93.
71. See S.C. CONST. art. VIII; WEST COMM. FINAL REPORT, supra note 68, at 84 93.
72. See S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 7.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See WEST COMM. FIN AL REPORT, supra note 68, at 87.
76. UNDERWOOD, Supra note 1. at 152.
77. See id. at 124.
78. See 1975 S.C. Acts 692.
79. See id. at 693-94.
80. See id. at 695-700.
81. The "county purpose doctrine," existing prior to the Home Rule Act, meant that counties
may only exercise those powers specifically granted to them in the constitution. See GRAHAM &
MOORE, supra note 2, at 199 (citing W. HARDY WICKWAR, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT 27-29 (1970)).
2013] 787
7
MacLennan: A Long Way from Home: Slow Progress Toward "Home Rule" in South C
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAw REVIEW
regulatory flexibility, certain taxing power, and authority to create subsidiary
82
governnent agencies.
The Home Rule Amendments and resulting legislation ushered in a new era
of government in South Carolina. Substantial power shifted away from the State
House to the new county governments. However, as discussed below in Part 111,
many issues were yet to be resolved. In the years following 1975, the South
Carolina Supreme Court's decisions halted the full shift to county-government
autonomy, challenging the purpose of the Home Rule Amendments and assuring
the General Assembly's continued dominance in South Carolina. 83
III. SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF HOME RULE
A. Implementation of Home Rule Through Special Legislation: The "One-
Shot" Approach
The first major opportunity for the South Carolina Supreme Court to
construe the Home Rule Amendments and Act occurred in 1976. In Duncan, a
group of York County taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of part of the
Act and two laws implementing home rule in York County.85 Plaintiffs first
argued that "Form 5"-the option in the Act that permitted counties to continue
to operate under the direction of the legislative delegation-was inconsistent
with new article VIII. A majority of the court agreed, holding that Form 5
forces a county to continue the status quo, which the constitution no longer
allowsi The court reasoned that a county operating under Form 5 must rely on
the delegation to pass local laws for that specific county, which are now clearly
prohibited.
Plaintiffs also challenged Act 448 of 1975 and Act 467 of 1976.89 Act 448
provided for a referendum date in York County to select a form of county
government as permitted by article VIII, section 7.90 Act 467 geographically
defined the election districts for the county council.9 Plaintiffs argued that,
because each Act only applied to York County, both violated section 7's
82. See 1975 S.C. Acts 695-700.
83. See Davis v. Richland Cnty. Council, 372 S.C. 497 501-04, 642 S.E.2d 740, 742-43
(2007) (citations omitted);- Hamm v. Cromer, 305 S.C. 305, 307-09, 408 S.E.2d 227, 228-29 (1991)
(citations omitted);- Horry Cnty. v. Cooke, 275 S.C. 19, 23-25, 267 SE.2d 82. 84-85 (1980)
(citations omitted).
84. See Duncan v. Cmy. of York. 267 S.C. 327, 228 S.E.2d 92 (1976).
85. Id. at 333, 228 S.E.2d at 94.
86. Id. at 340, 228 S.E.2d at 97-98.
87. See id. at 341, 228 S.E.2d at 98.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 344-46, 228 S.E.2d at 100-01 (citing 1975 S.C. Acts 1168: 1976 S.C. Acts
2535 (this Act is now listed as No. 903 in the Acts and Joints Resolutions, although the case says
Act No. 467)).
90. See id. at 344. 228 S.E.2d at 100 (citing 1975 S.C. Acts 1168).
91. See id. at 346. 228 S.E.2d at 101 (citing 1976 S.C. Acts 2535).
788 [VOL. 64: 781
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prohibition on legislation specific to one county.92 Although each act clearly
violated the prohibition on laws specific to one county, the court nevertheless
upheld both. In discussing its reasoning, the court established the so-called
"one-shot proposition."94
As the court explained, the "one-shot proposition" means that the General
Assembly may pass legislation specific to local governments "to the point
necessary to place [a]rticle VIII fully into operation," even though that particular
legislation technically violates the very constitutional provision it is seeking to
implement. 95  The court reached this conclusion by interpreting article VIII,
section 1.96 The relevant portion of that section provides, "The powers
possessed by all counties . . . at the effective date of this [c]onstitution shall
continue until changed in a manner provided by law."97 The court interpreted
that language to indicate that article VIII envisioned that the General Assembly
would pass local laws to implement home rule. 98 This determination was crucial
for local governments because additional legislation was needed to achieve the
home rule powers that article VIII contemplated. 99 The court also needed to
preserve section 7's purpose of preventing legislative delegations from continued
involvement in local issues by passing local laws. 00 To that end, the court
limited the "one-shot" exception to section 7's prohibition on local laws by
holding that "such authority is a temporary nature and extends only to the point
necessary to place [a]rticle VIII fully into operation." 101
The inevitable conflict that arose following Duncan concerned how to
determine what constitutes "one-shot" legislation.102 The General Assembly
struggled to find ways to enact legislation that devolved power to the local
governments without violating the restriction against local legislation. 10o The
General Assembly continued to pass local laws implementing home rule,
presumably with the intention not to go beyond the "one-shot" exception
allowed in Duncan.104 However, the South Carolina Supreme Court inhibited
92. See id. at 344-45, 228 S.E.2d at 100.
93. See id. at 345-46, 228 S.E.2d at 100-01.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 345, 228 S.E.2d at 100.
96. See id. (citing S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 1).
97. S.C. CONST. art. VIII, I (emphasis added).
98. See Duncan, 267 S.C. at 345, 228 S.E.2d at 100.
99. See UNDERWOOD, supra note 1, at 183 ("A new regime of local government could not be
introduced by abruptly putting the brakes on every aspect of General Assembly control of local
government. An orderly transition must occur.").
100. See id. ("A pattern of continued General Assembly involvement in the affairs of
individual counties was not permissible.").
101. Duncan, 267 S.C. at 345, 228 S.E.2d at 100.
102. See UNDERWOOD, supra note 1, at 184.
103. See id. at 200.
104. See id.
2013] 789
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the General Assembly's authority to enact local legislation in subsequent cases
by limiting the Duncan exception. 1o
B. Limiting the Duncan Exception
In its home rule jurisprudence, the court continually limited the Duncan
holding, thereby leaving the General Assembly almost no leeway to enact laws
106for one county and stalling further home rule legislation. In Horry County v.
Cooke,107 the court held that "[t]he transition to home rule is a 'one-shot' process
and once a legally constituted government becomes functional the Duncan case
exception ends, thereby precluding any Jiurther special legislation." 108  This
holding signaled that once a county government was established, the General
Assembly could no longer enact local legislation applicable to that county.
Even a law clearly consistent with the purpose of home rule would be struck
down because of section 7's prohibition on local bills. 110
Hamm v. Cromer'II provides an example of a good faith attempt to grant
more extensive home rule power to a county government.112 In Hamm, plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of a law granting the Newberry County Council
the power to appoint the board of the Newberry County Water and Sewer
Authority, upon approval by the Governor. Prior to that law, the Governor
had appointed the board upon the recommendation of the Newberry County
Legislative Delegation.' 14 The court noted that the law was a good faith effort to
promote home rule, but it held that the law ran afoul of the prohibition on local
legislation.115  The court recognized that such legislation, clearly intended to
105. See Davis v. Richland Cry. Council, 372 S.C. 497, 503, 642 S.E.2d 740, 743 (2007);
Hamm v. Cromer, 305 S.C. 305, 308. 408 S.E.2d 227. 229 (1991); Horry Cnty. v. Cooke, 275 S.C.
19, 23 24, 267 S.E.2d 82, 84 (1980); Van Fore v. Cooke, 273 S.C. 136, 139, 255 S.E.2d 339, 340
(1979).
106. See Horry Cnty., 275 S.C. at 23-24, 267 S.E.2d at 84: Van Fore, 273 S.C. at 139, 255
S.E.2d at 340: see also Richardson v. McCutchen. 278 S.C. 117, 120, 292 S.E.2d 787, 788 (1982)
(noting that the standard for the Duncan exception is whether the legislation is reasonably related to
establishing the initial form of government).
107. The Cooke litigation involved two cases. This Note uses "Cooke" to refer to Horry
County v. Cooke, 275 S.C. 19. 267 S.E.2d 82 (1980), not Van Fore v. Cooke, 273 S.C. 136, 255
S.E.2d 339 (1979).
108. Cooke. 275 S.C. at 24-25, 267 S.E.2d at 85 (emphasis added).
109. See id.
110. See id.: see also Hammn. 305 S.C. at 309, 408 S.E.2d at 229 ("While Act No. 784 may
well have been a good-faith attempt to promote home rule ... it still constitutes impermissible
special legislation .. .").
111. 305 S.C. 305, 408 S.E.2d 277.
I12. See id. at 306, 408 S.E.2d at 227 28.
113. See id. at 306-07, 408 S.E.2d at 228.
114. See id. at 306. 408 S.E.2d at 227.
115. See id. at 309. 408 S.E.2d at 229.
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promote home rule, had an admirable end.11 6 However, the court took issue with
the means taken to achieve that end.
The court recognized the implications of this holding: to grant more self-rule
power to a county council, the General Assembly is restricted to drafting general
legislation applicable to all counties, which the court acknowledged is an
"arduous task."118  Nevertheless, the court urged the General Assembly to
"exercise its authority and its responsibility in promoting home rule . . . by
devolving such powers on all individual counties."
In Davis v. Richland County Council,120 the South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed its reasoning and the result in Hamm, 121 bringing us to where we are
today. In sharply worded dissents in both Hamm and Davis, Chief Justice Toal
emphasized the roblem with the majority's reasoning and the court's home rule
jurisprudence. Chief Justice Toal would have upheld the laws in Hamm and
Davis as constitutional under the "one-shot proposition" espoused in Duncan.1
Acknowledging the Cooke limitation to the "one-shot proposition," Chief Justice
Toal argued that because the Newberry County Council never had legal control
over the Water and Sewer Authority, the transfer of control to the county council
fell within the Cooke exception of establishing initial county government. 1
In Hamm,. Chief Justice Toal ar ued that the majority focused too heavily on
the Act's "form over its function." Chief Justice Toal-a former member of
the General Assembly-noted the "onerous, if not impossible, task of crafting
general legislation that would place control of the [Water and Sewer] Authority
in the hands of the Newberry County Council."126 In Davis, Chief Justice Toal's
dissent, in which Justice Pleicones joined, was even more critical of the court's
opinion, and she asserted that the majority "continues to ignore the essential
purpose and intent" of home rule.127
The approach taken by Chief Justice Toal in Hamm and Davis is certainly
more consistent with the intent and purpose of the Home Rule Amendments. In
both cases, she argued for a broad interpretation of the Cooke limitation on the
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. 372 S.C. 497, 642 S.E.2d 740 (2007).
121. See id. at 503, 642 S.E.2d at 743 (citing Hanm, 305 S.C. at 307-09. 408 S.E.2d at 228-
29).
122. See id. at 504, 642 S.E.2d at 743-44 (Toal, CJ., dissenting); Hamm, 305 S.C. at 309-10,
408 S.E.2d at 229-30 (Toal, J., dissenting) (citing Duncan v. Cnty. of York, 267 S.C. 327. 345. 228
S.E.2d 92, 100 (1976)).
123. See Davis, 372 S.C. at 504, 642 S.E.2d at 744 (Toal, C.J., dissenting); Hamm, 305 S.C. at
310, 408 S.E.2d at 230 (Toal, J., dissenting) (citing Duncan, 267 S.C. at 345, 228 S.E.2d at 100).
124. See Hann. 305 S.C. at 310, 408 S.E.2d at 230 (Toal, J., dissenting) (citing Horry Cnty.
v. Cooke, 275 S.C. 19, 23-25, 267 S.E.2d 82, 84 85 (1980)).
125 Id.
126. Id.
127. Davis. 372 S.C. at 504. 642 S.E.2d at 743 (Toal, C.J., dissenting)..
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Duncan holding by focusing on function over form and reading section 7's
prohibition in light of article VIII as a whole. 8 The Chief Justice read the
Cooke limitation to mean that certain local laws fall within the establishment of
initial county government if the county government never before had the power
that the local law grants to it.19
IV. A WAY FORWARD
Local government in South Carolina looks much different than it did before
1973. 1 County governments now have many of the powers held by municipal
governments and have authority to act without legislative approval. 131 However,
as the South Carolina Supreme Court's home rule jurisprudence demonstrates,
South Carolina has a long way to go to achieve actual home rule.13 Legislative
control over local fiscal issues and over certain local boards continues to create a
disconnect between citizens and their local governments.1 3 Therefore, to
eliminate that situation, the South Carolina Supreme Court should return to the
original construction of article VIII, section 7 applied in Duncan and allow
limited local legislation to completely implement home rule.1 34 By doing so, the
court can relieve the General Assembly of the near-impossible task of drafting
general legislation devolving all power concerning local issues to local
governments.135
4. Responsibility of the Courts
In theory, the onus is on the General Assembly to enact laws, applicable to
all counties, that transfer greater self-rule to the county councils.136 In reality,
the responsibility to achieve true home rule in South Carolina lies with the South
Carolina Supreme Court. The theoretical approach seems like a "no-brainer"
solution. After all, the constitution instructs the General Assembly to provide by
128. See Davis, 372 S.C. at 504, 642 S.E.2d at 743-44;- Hamin, 305 S.C. at 309-10. 408
S.E.2d at 229-30.
129. See Davis, 372 S.C. at 504, 642 S.E.2d at 744 (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
130. See GRAHAM & MOORE, supra note 2, at 199 200 ("Today, a county has the potential to
deliver a full range of municipal services through the powers and duties authorized under the
updated state constitution.").
131. See id.
132. See Davis. 372 S.C. at 503. 642 S.E.2d at 743; Hamm, 305 S.C. at 309. 408 S.E.2d at
229.
133. See GRAHAM & MOORE, supra note 2, at 200; Scoppe, supra note 5, at D2.
134. See Duncan v. Cnty. ofYork, 267 S.C. 327, 345, 228 S.E.2d 92, 100 (1976).
135. See Hamin. 305 S.C. at 309, 408 S.E.2d at 229 (noting the difficulty of passing general
legislation devolving power to county councils).
136. See id. (instructing the General Assembly to draft general legislation to achieve true
home rule).
137. See id. at 310, 408 S.E.2d at 230 (Toal, J., dissenting) (arguing that she would relieve the
General Assembly from drafting general legislation).
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general law for "the structure, organization, powers, duties, functions, and the
responsibilities of counties." f However, the difficulty of enacting such
legislation is palpable. 139  The probability of securing a sufficient number of
votes from members of the General Assembly for a law that takes away their
own power in a wholesale fashion is low. It is much simpler to garner support
for such legislation when enacted on a piecemeal, county by county basis. 140
If a county delegation decides to grant more extensive home rule powers to a
local governing board, the South Carolina Supreme Court should not prevent it.
Certain delegations understandably wish to free themselves of the burden of
acting as local leislators because voters elect them to be their representatives on
statewide issues. By removing themselves from matters of local government,
legislators can devote more time to issues facing the state as a whole, creating a
more effective government at the state level. 142 Members of other delegations,
unaffected by legislation pertaining to other counties, should have no problem
agreeing to these laws.143
To this day, the General Assembly continues to enact local le islation
without regard to the constitutional prohibition and judicial precedent.14 Often,
these local laws are vetoed once they reach the Governor's desk. 14 If the
General Assembly overrides the veto, the legislation becomes law anyway.146
Having the General Assembly enact local legislation can lead to extensive and
costly litigation.147
138. S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 7.
139. See Hamm, 305 S.C. at 309, 408 S.E.2d at 229.
140. Examples of efforts to grant home rule powers to local govemments on a piecemeal basis
are abundant. See, e.g., Davis v. Richland Cnty. Council, 372 S.C. 497, 499, 642 S.E.2d 740, 741
(2007) (involving an Act providing that the authority to appoint members of the Richland County
Recreation Commission was devolved from the county's legislative delegation to the govering
body of the county); Haun, 305 S.C. at 306-07, 408 S.E.2d 227 28 (involving a good faith attempt
to grant more extensive home rule power to a county government by granting Newberry County
Council the power to appoint the board of the Newberry County Water and Sewer Authority, upon
approval by the Governor).
141. But see Scoppe, supra note 5. at D2 ("Fortunately, legislators have given up their power
to appoint most state boards. Unfortunately, they have clung to their appointments to governing
boards in their home counties.").
142. See id. (stating that focusing on local appointments "distract[s] legislators from their jobs
of overseeing state government").
143. See Duncan v. Cnty. of York, 267 S.C. 327, 334, 228 S.E.2d 92. 95 (1976).
144. See Cindi Ross Scoppe, Op-Ed., Constitution, Schmonstitution. Wf'e're S.C. Legislators,
THE STATE, Dec. 5, 2012, at A10, available at http://www.thestate.com/2012/12/05/2544182/
scoppe-constitution-schmonstitution.html.
145. See Scoppe, supra note 7, at A6.
146. See S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 21.
147. A recent example is the result of a 2007 law, passed by overriding a gubernatorial veto by
a vote of 12-to-0 in the House. which increased the membership and changed the composition of the
Charleston County Aviation Authority. 2007 S.C. Acts 310; [2007] 4 S.C. HOUSE J. 3905. The
South Carolina Public Interest Foundation and Charleston attorney Waring Howe filed suit against a
number of state officials arguing, inter alia. that the legislation, as enacted by the General
Assembly. was unconstitutional local legislation. The litigation is still ongoing. See Warren Lance
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Perhaps more importantly, the citizens of South Carolina have rejected this
outdated form of governance.148 Legislative rule of local government proved
ineffective, and the citizens demanded a change. 149  Government is more
responsible when there is a clear division of authority at the state and local
levels.1 0 The issues facing South Carolina statewide are more than sufficient to
occupy the attention of the members of the General Assembly and the legislative
calendar. 5 The citizens of South Carolina are better served by a system that
allows for state representatives to legislate on statewide issues, while local
governments attend to local issues.
B. 4 Clear Standard: 4 Limited Exception to Article VIII, Section 7
To achieve home rule and realize the goal of truly independent local
governments, the South Carolina Supreme Court should allow for local laws, at
least up to a point. A complete disregard of article VIII, section 7 by the court
would obviously lead to further legislative control and a substantial increase in
local legislation. Therefore, a narrow exception that preserves the purpose of
section 7 is the best solution.
The Duncan approach accomplishes this objective.152 Yet, this approach, by
itself, would not provide a clear directive for the General Assembly. Thus, the
court should adopt the Duncan analysis, as clarified by Chief Justice Toal's
positions in Hamm and Davis. 154 By using this standard, the court can spur the
development of home rule, while maintaining section 7's intent to remove local
legislation from the State House.155
The gist of the modified Duncan standard can be summarized as follows: the
South Carolina Supreme Court should allow local laws narrowly tailored to
Wise, Judge Could Rule Soon on Airport Board fember Laisuit, POST & COURIER (Feb. 14, 2013,
4:22 PM), http://www.postandcourier.com/airticle/20130214/PC05/130219532/1011/judge-could-
rule-soon-on-airport-board-member-law suit.
148. See, e.g., Knight v. Salisbury, 262 S.C. 565, 569, 206 S.E.2d 875, 876 (1974) ("Article
VIII reflects a serious effort upon the part of the electorate and the General Assembly to restore
local government to the county level.").
149. See, e.g., Duncan v. Cnty. of York, 267 S.C. 327, 341, 228 S.E.2d 92, 98 (1976)
(declaring that the people of South Carolina "mandated a change" to the constitution).
150. See Scoppe, supra note 6, at D2.
151. See Cindi Ross Scoppe, Op-Ed., The Catch-22 of Fixing Richland Election 1ess. TI-
STATE, Dec. 12, 2012, at A10, available at http://www.thestate.com/2012/ 2/12/2552740/scoppe-
the-catch-22-of-fixing.html (arguing that state legislators "clearly need to do a better job" governing
the state).
152. See Duncan, 267 S.C. at 345, 228 S.E.2d at 100.
153. See UNDERWOOD, supra note 1, at 184 (citing Duncan, 267 S.C. at 344-45, 228 S.E.2d at
100) (noting that the General Assembly struggled to find ways to enact local laws in the wake of
Duncan).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 122-29; see also Duncan, 267 S.C. at 345, 228
S.E.2d at 100 (laying down the analysis that Chief Justice Toal would clarify and adopt).
155. See Davis, 372 S.C. at 504, 642 S.E.2d at 744 (Toal, CJ., dissenting) (stating the intent of
section 7 is to "diminish legislative interaction in local government").
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implement home rule by shifting control from the General Assembly to the local
governments as exceptions to section 7's prohibition against local laws.15 6 This
rule is consistent with the court's original application of section 7 in Duncan.5 7
Therefore, it is not a radical departure from precedent. It would, however,
require a reevaluation and overruling of the court's hardline holdings in Cooke,
Hamm, and Davis. 158
The adoption of this standard would raise concerns that the operation of
article VIII, section 7 will become meaningless. Critics may argue that such
an exception to section 7's prohibition on local laws will open a Pandora's box
of local laws meant to circumscribe local-government authority. However, that
need not, and should not, be the result. 60 Section 7's prohibition on local
legislation is vital to the operation of home rule. 161 The prohibition serves the
same purpose as that which underlies the Home Rule Amendments as a whole-
to remove legislative interference from peculiarly local issues.162 Therefore, the
prohibition on local legislation should not be read in isolation. Rather, it should
be considered in light of article VIII as a whole. 6 3  The modified Duncan
approach, as advocated here, accomplishes this broader framework by taking
heed of the history and the additional provisions of article VIII.164
The modified Duncan approach will not lead to further legislative
interference and control of local government because the approach contains
definite boundaries. 165 As modified in Cooke, the Duncan exception applies
only to the formation of initial county government. 1 Therefore, a local law that
does not establish initial county government by giving the county initial or new
156. Compare Duncan, 267 S.C. at 345, 228 S.E.2d at 100 ("one-shot" proposition), with
Haun, 305 S.C. at 309 10, 408 S.E.2d at 229 30 (Toal, J., dissenting) (stating that the "transfer of
control ... constitutes the establishment of initial county government"), and Davis, 372 S.C. at 504.
642 S.E.2d at 743-44 (Toal, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the "transfer of authority . . . constitutes
the establishment of initial county government").
157. See Duncan, 267 S.C. at 345, 228 S.E.2d at 100.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 108-10. 115-18. 121.
159. See Van Fore v. Cooke, 273 S.C. 136. 139. 255 S.E.2d 339. 340 (1979) (noting that
section 7 does not allow continued legislative meddling in local affairs).
160. See Davis, 372 S.C. at 504, 642 S.E.2d at 744 (Toal, C.J, dissenting) (agreeing the intent
of section 7 is to "diminish legislative interaction in local govermnent").
161. See, e.g., id. at 504, 642 S.E.2d at 743 (arguing that "the majority continues to ignore the
essential purpose and intent of the constitutional provisions enacted to aid in 'home rule'").
162. See Hanm. 305 S.C. at 309-10. 408 S.E.2d at 229-30 (Toal, J., dissenting).
163. See Davis. 372 S.C. at 504. 642 S.E.2d at 743-44 (Toal. CJ.. dissenting); Hanmm, 305
S.C. at 309-310, 408 S.E.2d at 229 30 (Toal, J., dissenting).
164. See generally S C. CONST. art. VIII (provisions dealing with "local government");, WEST
COMM. FINAL REPORT, supra note 68 (providing legislative history on changes to the South
Carolina Constitution).
165. See Duncan v. Cnty. of York, 267 S.C. 327, 345, 228 S.E.2d 92, 100 (1976) (stating that
the authority to enact local laws "is [of] a temporary nature and extends only to the point necessary
to place [a]rticle VIII fully into operation").
166. See Horry Cnty. v. Cooke. 275 S.C. 19, 24, 267 S.E.2d 82, 84-85 (1980).
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powers violates the prohibition.167 This limitation on the exception prevents the
General Assembly from "repeatedly inject[ing] its will into the operation of
county government."168
C. 4n Opportunity for the Court
There are two significant problems that exist in South Carolina as a result of
the currently stalled development of home rule. The first is continued leislative
involvement in appointing members to local boards and commissions. The
second is the abundance of special-purpose districts that are stuck in limbo. 170
While these two issues are separate, they often become intertwined because
legislative delegations are charged with appointing members to govern special-
purpose districts. 11
1. Richland County Election Nightmare
The recent election fiasco in Richland County serves as an important
reminder that legislative control over local governments continues to exist. In
2011, the Richland County Legislative Delegation introduced legislation
17combining the county's election and voter registration agencies. 1 The Act was
constitutionally suspect considering the court's current precedent, but it became
law nonetheless.' 4 Not surprisingly, under the law, the delegation retained the
power to appoint the county election commission's members. The
delegation's power to appoint members to a local agency is not an anomaly.176
Across the state, legislators continue to control local affairs by exercising
appointment power.
167. See id.
168. Van Fore v. Cooke, 273 S.C. 136. 139. 255 S.E.2d 339, 340 (1979).
169. See Scoppe, supra note 5, at D2.
170. See Cindi Ross Scoppe, Op-Ed., The Legislature's Special Little Governments, THE
STATE, Dec. 20, 2012, at A8, available at http://www.thestate.com/2012/12/20/2562395/scoppe-
the-sc-legislatures-special.html.
171. See, e.g., Davis v. Richland Cnty. Council, 372 S.C. 497, 642 S.E.2d 740 (2007)
(Richland County Recreation Commission); Hiamm v. Cromer, 305 S.C. 305, 408 S.E.2d 227 (1991)
(Newberry County Water and Sewer Authority).
172. See Scoppe, supra note 7, at A6.
173. See 2011 S.C. Acts 67, available at http://www.scstatehouse.go-/Acts&JointResolutions/
2011/201 1Acts&JointResolutionsVolumel.pdf.
174. See 2012 Op. S.C. Att'y Geii., 2012 WL 6061812 (Nov. 26, 2012): 2007 Op. S.C. Att'y
Gen., 2007 WL 3244888 (Aug. 14, 2007).
175. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-27-405(A)(1) (Supp. 2011).
176. See Scoppe, supra note 5, at D2.
177. See id.
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The aftermath of the poorly managed election highlights the problem with
the delegation's control of the commission. 8 The law allowed the delegation to
appoint the first director of the commission, but it gave no one clear authority to
fire the director.179 Although the commission is responsible for hiring and firing
subsequent directors, the commission itself is not accountable to the angry voters
who waited at the polls for hours or who left the polls without casting their
ballots because of excessive delays. 8 0 Richland County residents, who are in
the best position to assess the performance of the election commission, have no
authority to elect the members that control the management of the process by
which they vote.181 An easy solution is to allow the county council to appoint
the members of the election commission.18  However, to grant the county
council this responsibility, a local law must be passed.
If Richland County's delegation takes legislative action to transfer the
appointment power for the county election commission to the county council, it
may present the South Carolina Supreme Court with an opportunity to overrule
its post-Duncan decisions and return to the original interpretation that Duncan
provided. 184 Such a bill would further the implementation of home rule and
would not allow the General Assembly to "repeatedly inject its will into the
operation of county government."1 In fact, as Chief Justice Toal noted in
Davis, striking down such legislation preserves continued legislative
involvement in local affairs, as seen in the Richland County example.186
2. The Problem with Special-Purpose Districts
Another problem resulting from the home rule stalemate is the existence of
special-purpose districts. ' Before the enactment of the Home Rule
Amendments, the General Assembly created special-purpose districts to perform
local functions that the counties were not able to perform under the South
178. See Warren Bolton, Op-Ed., Home Rule: Mvth or Realitv?. THE STATE, Dec. 7. 2012. at
AI 4, available at http://www.thestate.com/2012 12/07/2547190/bolton-home-rule-myth-oir-reality.htm1.
179. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-27-405(A)(5); 2012 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 2012 WL 6061812
(Nov. 26, 2012).
180. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-27-405(A)(5); Bolton, supra note 178, at A 14.
181. See Bolton, supra note 178, at A14.
182. See Scoppe, supra note 7, at A6.
183. See Scoppe, supra note 6, at D2.
184. See Scoppe, supra note 7, at A6 (discussing the possibility of the Richland County
delegation giving the Richland County Council control over the election commission).
185. Van Fore v. Cooke. 273 S.C. 136, 139, 255 S.E.2d 339, 340 (1979).
186. Davis v. Richland Cnty. Council, 372 S.C. 497, 504, 642 S.E.2d 740, 744 (2007) (Toal,
C.J., dissenting).
187. See Scoppe, supra note 170, at A8. See generally GRAHAM & MOORE, supra note 2. at
209 (detailing the forn and function of special-purpose districts).
2013] 797
17
MacLennan: A Long Way from Home: Slow Progress Toward "Home Rule" in South C
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAw REVIEW
Carolina Constitution of 1895. For example, many of the districts were
created to provide water and sewer services to citizens in rural areas.189
The General Assembly can no longer create new special-purpose districts, 190
but many districts that were created before the Home Rule Amendments still
exist.191 In Spartanburg Sanitary Sewier District v. City of Spartanburg, 192the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that article VIII, section 7 applies to local
legislation affecting special-purpose districts. 193  However, special-purpose
districts that cross county lines, or are operated by more than one county, are
within the General Assembly's jurisdiction.194 Many of the special-purpose
districts in existence are simply no longer necessary.195 Counties are now
capable of roviding the services that special-purpose districts have traditional
provided. As a result, there is a conflict of governance at the local level.
For instance, a county can provide water and sewer services, but it cannot
provide such services within a special-purpose district created for that
function.198
Both issues-appointment power and special-pur ose districts-were before
the South Carolina Supreme Court in Hamm. The conflict remains
unresolved, and it is likely that the issue will return to the court.200 A local law
that allows a county to assume responsibility held by a special-purpose district,
or a law transferring appointment power to the county council, is an example of
a law that fits nicely within the modified Duncan approach. Such laws
relinquish legislative involvement in local government and grant initial powers
to county government.201
188. See Scoppe, supra note 170, at A8.
189. See GRAHAM & MOORE, supra note 2, at 209 (citing Charlie B. Tyer, lie Special
Purpose District in South Carolina, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH CAROLINA VOLUME 1: THE
GOvERNEiz NTAL LANDSCAPE 75-89 (Charlie B. Tyer & Cole Blease Graham, Jr. eds., 1988)).
190. See Knight v. Salisbury, 262 S.C. 565, 572, 206 S.E.2d 875, 878 (1974).
191. See Scoppe, supra note 170, at A8 (noting that more than 500 special-purpose districts
exist in South Carolina).
192. 283 S.C. 67, 321 S.E.2d 258 (1984).
193. See id. at 81, 321 S.E.2d at 266.
194. See Kleckley v. Pulliam, 265 S.C. 177, 185, 217 S.E.2d 217, 221 (1975).
195. See Scoppe, supra note 170, at A8.
196. See GRAHAM & MOORE, supra note 2, at 216.
197. See Scoppe, supra note 170, at A8.
198. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-55-1410(A) (2002).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 112-17.
200. See Scoppe, supra note 151, at A10.
201. See Davis v. Richland Cnty. Council, 372 S.C. 497, 504, 642 S.E.2d 740, 744 (2007)
(Toal, C.J., dissenting) (noting that striking down the law at issue preserves legislative interference
with local government).
798 [VOL. 64: 781
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss4/2
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
V. CONCLUSION
South Carolina's struggle to achieve true home rule can be attributed to a
disinclination to move away from a top-down system of government
characterized by preeminent General Assembly power. 20 In addition, the South
Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation of the Home Rule Amendments has
discouraged, if not prevented, a clean break from the past.203 As a result, various
remnants of an outdated governing structure remain to this day.204
The current composition of the South Carolina Supreme Court provides
hope that it will reconsider its precedent. Two of the five members, Chief
Justice Toal and Justice Pleicones. dissented in Davis.205 The other three current
JusticeS206 were not on the court at the time of Hamm or Davis.
As South Carolina looks to the future, the state must decide how best to deal
with these problems. Perhaps, the system in place today is the best solution
going forward. Maybe numerous aoverning bodies all exercising substantial
control is not a perfect system. Tight legislative control over political
subdivisions certainly consolidates authority. These macro questions about the
most effective way to govern a state are beyond the scope of this Note.
Regardless, recent history demonstrates that South Carolinians prefer a system
that allows local governments to exercise certain functions without control or
restraint from the State House.208 There may be many different ways to
empower our local governments going forward. The solution outlined in this
Note is one in which the South Carolina Supreme Court takes the lead.
Whatever the answer may be, South Carolinians deserve a government, at every
level, that is both responsive and accountable to the people.
Pierce T MacLennan
202. See GRAHAM & MOORE, supra note 2. at 216 ("The present local governments reflect the
historical perspective of the state . . . .").
203. See supra text accompanying notes 115 21.
204. See UNDERWOOD, supra note I, at 245-49 (citations omitted) (detailing how the General
Assembly continues to control local governnent); Scoppe, supra note 5. at D2; Scoppe supra note
6. at D2.
205. See Davis, 372 S.C. 497, 504, 642 S.E.2d 740. 743-44 (2007) (Toal, C.J., dissenting).
206. The other three are Justices Beatty. Hearn, and Kittredge. Justice Beatty served on the
Spartanburg City Council and was also a member of the General Assembly prior to joining the
bench. See Justice Donald WV Beatty, S.C. SUP. CT., http://www.judicial.state. sc.us/supreme/
displayJustice.cfmjudgeID= 1134 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
207. See GRAiHM & MOORE, supra note 2, at 225 ("Today. some critics assail a
governnental structure that is so decentralized that one official literally does not know wvhat another
is doing.").
208. See Knight v. Salisbury, 262 S.C. 565, 569, 206 S.E.2d 875, 876 (1974) ("Article VIII
reflects a serious effort upon the part of the electorate and the General Assembly to restore local
governnent to the county level.").
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